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Abstract: As an outstanding thinker in the Eastern Han Dynasty of China, Wang Chong wrote many books during
his lifetime, but all of them were lost except Lunheng. The purport of Lunheng is to reveal and criticize all kinds of
"Xuwang（an ancient Chinese word, with the similar meaning of falsehood, fallacy, etc.）" in the society at that
time. In our opinion, the ideological support behind Lunheng is Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation.
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1. Introduction
Wang Chong (27 AD-c. 97 AD) was a philosopher in the Eastern Han Dynasty of China, and he
was also an outstanding thinker, educator and forerunner of thoughts on argumentation in early
China. Wang Chong was diligent and eager to learn during his childhood, and after growing up,
he entered the official career. However, influenced by his upright and forthright upbringing, he
was repeatedly frustrated and even dismissed from his position as an official in the royal court,
leaving himself in a state of poverty. The times were destined that Wang Chong would be a tragic
and insignificant role in political circles. However, it was precisely because of his frustrated and
unsuccessful experience in official career that Wang Chong was braver and determined to carry
the banner of criticism, and wrote such a great book as Lunheng, which left valuable ideological
materials for later generations.
In the pre-Qin period (before 221 BC), some well-known philosophers and thinkers, such
as Confucius and Mencius, had discussed many ideas related to argumentation in the
communication and development of their schools. However, during the Qin Dynasty (221-207
BC), the Legalist thoughts, as the official philosophy, constrained the development of various
theories such as Ming-Bian (i.e, ancient Chinese logic) both politically and ideologically. By the
time of the Western Han Dynasty (202 BC-8 AD), the ruling class adopted Dong Zhongshu's
proposal that worshiped Confucianism only, in order to maintain their dominant position. The
development of the Confucian school represented by Dong Zhongshu was unprecedented, but
this development also caused people to start to exaggerate the theological and superstitious
elements of Confucianism. Moreover, the proliferation of such superstitions also led to
*
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misunderstandings about the truth of certain things and statements. It was under the rule of this
extreme ideology in these two periods that the development of Chinese logic and argumentation
thoughts fell into a low tide. However, in the early Eastern Han Dynasty, the emergence of Wang
Chong and his Lunheng brought hope to the development of the sluggish logic and
argumentation thoughts. Wang Chong criticized many of the claims he heard and considered to
be “Xuwang（an ancient Chinese word, with the similar meaning of falsehood, fallacy, the
unfounded, the fabricated, or the invented, etc.” in Lunheng. Because of this, when evaluating
the purpose of writing the Lunheng, he said, “the Lunheng, though which has about one hundred
chapters, can be summed up in one sentence: ‘Ji Xuwang’”(Yiwen, chapter in Vol. 20 of
Lunheng). (Note: All the chapters cited in this paper are from the Luncheng, in the following
passages only the title of the chapter is marked behind the quotations.) That is to say, the main
idea and main content of the book is to refute the false statements and misunderstandings. And
those false discourse and statements, in essence, are kinds of fallacies.（During that period, for
example, Confucianism was further mythologized and Confucius was touted as a sage and a man
of god. At that time, many Confucian scholars in the society “believed that what the sages said
are always right”, which was a typical fallacy of “appeal to authority” from the perspective of
contemporary argumentation research.）Then we can learn from Lunheng that when Wang
Chong criticized various kinds of “Xuwang” in the society, he consciously used the method of
argumentation as a tool to identify and analyze different fallacies, and formed his unique
thoughts on argumentation.
Wang Chong wrote many books in his life, among which Lunheng is the main work of
Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation, with a total of 84 chapters in 30 volumes1. The book
is called the Lunheng because, according to Wang Chong, it is about weighing the right and
wrong of claims and establishing criteria for judging the truth and falsity of statements or
propositions. Although from a philosophical point of view, the thought expressed in Lunheng is
Wang Chong's criticism of idealism such as divination and superstition, he used many reasonable
approaches of argumentation in the process of criticism. No matter from the thoughts on
argumentation, or from the thoughts of “Tuilei (i.e., reasoning by analogy)” and criticism of
fallacies, Lunheng clearly shows the richness of the ideas on argumentation it contains. It can be
said that Lunheng is a treasure handed down in the history of ancient Chinese thoughts on
argumentation.
The following contents of this paper are divided into three parts. The first part is to
introduce the current studies about Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation in China, which is
mainly an overview of the content of Wang Chong's “logic of arguments”2 in the early research
on the history of Chinese logic. There are many researches and dissertations on Wang Chong in
China and even in other countries, but so far there is little research on his thoughts of
argumentation. Therefore, this part is mostly the product of the discussions about and
explorations into his ideas on argumentation by modern Chinese scholars from the perspective of
logic (especially traditional logic), including his thoughts on definition, requirements and
approaches of argumentation. The second part is based on the first part, which is the summary of
the predecessors, to further understand and expand Wang Chong's argumentation thoughts
through the relevant concepts of argumentation theory in different dimensions, and the core
motivation of this expanded content is the “practical” part of his thoughts on argumentation. The
last part is a conclusion and some further considerations on the relevant topic.
1
2

According to historical records, there should be more than one hundred chapters, but some of them were lost later.
Some Chinese scholars introduce this term to express certain study on argumentation, see section 2 for details.

2. A survey of Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation in the perspective of traditional
logic
In the early studies of the history of ancient Chinese logic, taking Wang Chong's thoughts on
argumentation as an example, many Chinese scholars tend to call the related contents by a joint
term—“Wang Chong's logic of argument.” One of the reasons is that influenced by the
translation of early Chinese logic scholars, the other reason is that some of the scholars have
accepted the vague and general usage of “logic of...”to mean “...theory.” As a starting point, we
will have a brief overview of some current known research contents about Wang Chong's
thoughts on argumentation in the perspective of logic of argument.
Wang Chong said that his book Lunheng “is neither about ‘Zuo (creation)’, nor about
‘Shu (explanation of others’ opinions)’, but about ‘Lun (exposition and argumentation)’”
(Duizuo). “Lun” contains both “Li” (the literal translation is similar to “establish/construct”, here
refers to “present an argument”) and “Po” (As above is similar to “break/destroy”, here refers to
“refute/rebut”). The former (Li) is similar to the logical proof, and is what he calls “Zheng
Zhenshi (judging or determining the truth of an argument)” (Dingxian), while the latter (Po), like
the logical refutation, is what he calls “Ji Xuwang (refuting or rebutting a fallacy)” (Yiwen).
Since some Chinese scholars think “Li” and “Po” are two basic concepts in traditional logic, they
summarize the ideas on argumentation in Lunheng as “logic of argument”. In addition, Wang
Chong also said, “Lunheng is written for weighing the right and wrong of statements and
establish standards for judging the truth of statements. According to the above content, some
scholars put forward that “Lunheng is a book about determining the standards whether some
arguments and topics are true or false, and the whole book systematically expounds the
argumentation”, including the following contents.
2.1. The definition of argumentation
In Lunheng, Wang Chong wrote:
Argumentation is used to distinguish right from wrong. (Ziji)
If someone’s claim about something is contrary to the facts and can't produce evidences
to prove it, no one will believe it, no matter how many nice words he/she said repeatedly.
(Zhishi)
There must be reasonable and unreasonable in a lawsuit, and there must be right and
wrong in an argumentation. The part that is wrong and unreasonable loses, and the part
that is right and reasonable wins. (Wushi)
To sum up the above sentences, we can get following conclusions: Argumentation is a thinking
process of debating or arguing about the truth of a thesis or proposition; if a thesis or proposition
violates the truth of the facts and cannot be proved by evidences, it cannot be convincing; only if
a thesis or proposition is true and the way of the argument is right (“reasonable”), can it be
established (“win”). It is not difficult to see that Wang Chong's definition of argumentation is of
the embryonic form of the definition in traditional logic, and also takes into account the truth of a

thesis or proposition, laying a foreshadowing for the following contents of the requirements of
argumentation.
2.2. The requirements of argumentation
Wang Chong proposed to distinguish right from wrong by argumentation, nevertheless, how to
use the approaches of argumentation? And what principles should be followed in the process of
argumentation in order to achieve the purpose of distinguishing right from wrong, true from
false?
Wang Chong put forward the following requirements in his Lunheng:
Yin Xiaoyan & Li Zhengyan (To test and verify with factual effects, in other words, to
prove by valid arguments.)
Wang Chong put forward the following points in the chapter of Bozang in Lunheng:
There is nothing can make things clearer than “Xiaoyan”, and there is no more definite
argument than evidence. Even if there are fundamental reasons for empty words, people
will still not be convinced.
“Xiaoyan” in the above passage means valid arguments. In Wang Chong’s view, a thesis or
proposition can be proved effective only by “Xiaoyan” (valid arguments); otherwise, no one will
be convinced even if the thesis or proposition itself makes sense.
Then how does that work? Wang Chong wrote,
Think with your mind when making an argument, test it with facts (evidences), and the
exaggerated and false things will be verified immediately. (Duizuo)
“Think with your mind” here is actually a thinking activity of reasoning, and “test it with
facts (evidences)” is a kind of proof rule in logic, that is, the arguments must be true. In
Wang Chong's view, an argumentation can only be recognized and accepted by others
through “Xiaoyan”, however, it requires not only definite argument(s), but also that the
argument(s) should be in line with the actual situation.
Wang Chong further put forward the viewpoint of “Zhengyan.” In his opinion, “Xiaoyan” is not
only the premise of “Zhengyan,” but also the inference basis of “Zhengyan.” If we want to prove
a thesis, we not only need to "Yin Xiaoyan," that is to say, to find out the arguments (premises)
to verify the proof, but also need to "Li Zhengyan," that is, to establish or construct an
argumentation process from the premise to the conclusion and clearly prove the argumentation.
This requirement is one of the core elements of Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation, and is
reflected in various argumentation contents in Lunheng.
Lun Guishi and Shi Shangran (The thesis or topic must be correct and the arguments must be
true.)
Wang Chong pointed out that a good argumentation not only needs to “test it with facts”,
but also needs to match what it “proves” with the reality. He wrote in the chapter of Ziji: “The

main point of the issue under discussion lies in the correct content rather than the fancy words.
The basis for discussing things should also be true to reality rather than to cater to others (false
reasons).”
From what Wang Chong stated, we can conclude that it requires us to make the topics or
theses correct and the arguments true and reliable in an argumentation.
Then how to ensure that the topics are correct and the arguments are true and reliable? Wang
Chong insisted that for “Yan” (i.e., “what we say”), we should “repeatedly analyze what it
expresses”, and for “Xing” (i.e., “what we do”), we should “carefully examine its reasons or
grounds.” As for an argumentation concerning “Yan” and “Xing,” only by repeatedly and
carefully analyzing and examining what the topic or thesis is and the origin and basis of the
arguments can we ensure that the topics are correct and the arguments are true and reliable. In
order to do this, Wang Chong made the following requirements: 1), there needs to be a “good
heart.” Here the “good heart” is amount to the “good mind” today, since ancient Chinese think
the “heart” is the organ of human thinking. In this sense, to have a “good heart” just means to be
able to think correctly. So Wang Chong added, “a good heart can distinguish right from wrong”
(Dingxian). Besides, it is necessary to be “clear-headed and not confused by the preferences of
ordinary people” (Chaoqi). This shows that if a person has the right mind (here also can be
understood as rational thinking consciousness), he/she will not be confused by the common
falsehood, nor will he/she “only obey the wishes of the public”, but he/should take a critical view
to explore the problem in the right way of thinking. Such above expressions by Wang Chong not
only present a “truth-seeking and pragmatic” requirement and attitude to argumentation, but also
criticize and avoid some types of fallacies that we have summed up in modern times, such as
“argumentum ad populum (Latin for ‘appeal to the people’).” 2) Wang Chong mentioned that it
is also necessary to prevent “modifying your appearance in order to be similar to others” and
“modifying your words in order to cater to others.” That is to say, it is not possible to make
analogies with the superficial similarity of things, or to make specious arguments with some
plausible words. Otherwise, as Wang Chong wrote,
If you modify your appearance too much to be similar to others, you will lose your
original appearance; if you modify your words too much in order to cater to others, you
will lose the content of your thoughts. (Ziji)
We should neither achieve the imitation of appearance simply by seeking the similarity of things,
nor should we make plausible discourses just to cater to the opinions of others. The content of
“clear-headed and not confused by the preferences of ordinary people” mentioned above is
actually somewhat similar to what Wang Chong emphasizes here, the difference is that the
former is a direct explanation and more emphasis on the argumentative practice in daily life,
while the latter is an indirect explanation and more emphasis on the argumentative expression of
the written language.
Yan Kexiao & Zhi Kedu (The topic and its main purpose should be understandable.)
Wang Chong mentioned in the chapter of Ziji that some people thought the contents of his
articles were too simple and superficial, not as elegant and profound as the scriptures written by
ancient sages. For this, Wang Chong responded,
When you speak, you must speak clearly. When you write an article, you must write it in
a way of making it easily understood.

The reason why sages make people feel elegant is because they can both make people understand
what they say (that is, “Yan Kexiao” in his words) and get the main purpose of what they express
(that is, “Zhi Kedu” in his words). Only by meeting these two requirements can a speech or an
article make the audience feel that it is “as if the blind could see again and the deaf could hear
the voice.”
So far it can be inferred from the above that Wang Chong's ideas on the requirements for
argumentation are relatively comprehensive. These requirements almost involve most of the
rules concerning proofs in the traditional logic, which include: (1) The thesis or topic must be
correct（“Lun Guishi”）; (2) its main purpose must be clear（“Zhi Kedu”）; (3) The
argumentation must be proved by arguments（“Yin Xiaoyan”）; (4) the arguments must be true
（“Shi Shangran”）, which cannot be contrary to the facts or the objective truth; and, (5) To be
able to prove the topics logically from the arguments（“Li Zhengyan”）, one must not commit
such fallacies as “only obeying the wishes of the public”, “using the fancy but hollow words”,
“reasoning by forced analogy”, “emphasizing on rhetoric”, and “just taking a name”, and so on.
2.3 The approaches of argumentation
Wang Chong proposed some approaches of argumentation in Lunheng:
1. Citing specific matters to prove the content of the argumentation.
“Citing specific matters to prove the content of the argumentation”(Ziran) in the approach
of argumentation is to use facts as evidences to argue, which is also what Wang Chong
called “testing and verifying with (actual) things”(Lunsi).
Wang Chong said that “we must rely on our ears and eyes to determine the truth of
things”(Shizhi). He affirmed that the perceptual knowledge is the basis of cognition, so he
believed that the facts obtained by observation, experiments and other methods are reliable for
“Xiaoyan (valid arguments).” For a topic, he often begins by asking “how to find the evidences”
and “how to determine and prove the truth of the argument(s).” Then he would list some of the
“things” or “facts” he got as examples and make inferences, so as to summarize a general
conclusion to prove the truth or falsity of a topical proposition. This approach of argumentation,
in terms of the way in which its conclusion is drawn, obviously belongs to the inductive method.
Taking the chapter of Leixu in Lunheng as an example, the argument that “Thunder and lightning
is a kind of fire” is introduced as follows:
1) If you look at the body of a man who has been hit by thunder and died, you will find that if
thunder and lightning hit him on the head, his hair and beard would be burned, and if thunder
and lightning hit him on the body, the skin would be burned, and the smell of fire would be
found near his body. That's one of the proofs.
2) Taoist experimentalists hold that a stone heated by a thunder-clap, becomes red. If it be
thrown into a well, the stone being burning hot and the water in the well cold, an explosion
ensues with a loud detonation like thunder. This is the second proof.
3) When somebody suffers from a cold, the cold fluid enters his stomach. The stomach being
as a rule warm within, the warmth and the cold struggle together, and the exploding air gives

a thunder-like sound. This is the third proof.
4) In a thunder-storm brilliant lightning appears every now and then like the glares of big
fires. This is the fourth proof.
5) When the lightning strikes, it often burns man's houses and buildings, or grass and trees.
This is the fifth proof.
Except for the second proof, all the other (four) proofs can be directly observed or felt by the
senses, while the second proof is a result of the experiment. From the above “five proofs”, a
general conclusion that “thunder and lightning is a kind of fire” can be drawn. This method is an
induction by Simple Enumeration. In this chapter, Wang Chong not only proves that “thunder
and lightning is a kind of fire”, but also proves that “thunder and lightning is caused by
extremely strong ‘Yang-qi’3 impacting ‘Yin-qi’4.” He wrote,
In fact thunder is nothing else than the exploding solar fluid. How do we know? ---In the
first month the Yang-qi begins to be roused, consequently we have the first thunder
during the first month. In the fifth month Yang-qi is at its cynosure, therefore at that time
thunder rapidly follows upon thunder. In autumn and winter Yang-qi declines, therefore
thunder ceases during these seasons. In the midst of summer the sun reigns supreme, but
the Yin-qi endeavors to get the upper hand. In this dispute of the Yang and the Yin fluids
it comes to frictions, and these frictions lead to explosions and shooting, which are
destructive.
The sentence pattern “…therefore...” Wang Chong used in the above passage shows that he has a
deposition to explore the causal relationship between the phenomena and his argumentation
method is based on the causality.
2. Other approaches
While affirming that “we must rely on our ears and eyes to determine the truth of matters”, Wang
Chong emphasized that “we should not only rely on our eyes and ears to judge what is right and
wrong, but also rely on our inner thinking.” Therefore, in the approaches of argumentation, he
put forward “citing specific matters to prove the argumentation”, but also emphasized on
“verifying by analogy” and that “a comparative study of various things can confirm which view
is correct”. As for the understanding of “comparative study”, many scholars classify it as
“Tuilei”5. “Tuilei,” with more extensive meaning and more flexible usage, is roughly equivalent
to what we now call the “reasoning by classes.” It not only refers to analogical reasoning, but
also refers to various methods including deductive reasoning, reductio ad absurdum (reduction to
absurdity), dilemma reasoning and so on. Here is just one example to illustrate it. For example,
Wang Chong argued that “there are no ghosts or gods in sacrificial rites” and that “it is useless to
remove them (ghosts or gods)” in the chapter of Jiechu. He wrote:
What do ghosts and gods want to do in people's house?
If they are meant to hurt people, they will be hidden when the sacrificial rites of removing ghosts
The proper noun of traditional Chinese medicine, here is an ancient Chinese word, which means vitality or warm
air(energy).
4 It is also an ancient Chinese word here, which is opposite to “Yang-qi” and means cold air(energy).
5 It is a kind of inference/reasoning that depends on category in ancient China.
3

is carried out, and when the rites are over, they will return to where they were before.
If they don't want to hurt people, there's no harm in just living in people's homes.
In terms of reasoning methods, here includes at least two kinds: reductio ad absurdum and
dilemma reasoning.
First of all, Wang Chong assumes that there are ghosts and gods, and they have thoughts.
From this proposition, he puts forward a question, which leads to the idea that ghosts and gods
may or may not be harmful to people. According to the idea that “the mind of ghosts and gods
cannot be inferred”, that is, it is a kind of unknown, invisible and insensible, thus refuting the
previous proposition of “there are ghosts and gods ,and they have thoughts”, and then draw the
conclusion that “it is useless to remove them (ghosts or gods)”. This method of reasoning is very
similar to reductio ad absurdum: starting with a proposition, first assume it is true and then make
inferences, finally draw an absurd conclusion and use this conclusion to refute the previously
assumed proposition. The reasoning process can be formally expressed as:

p → (q  q )
 p
Secondly, from the two hypothetical propositions: If the ghosts and gods are meant to
harm people, they will be hidden when the sacrificial rites of removing ghosts is carried out...the
sacrificial rites of removing them are meaningless. If they don't want to harm people...the
sacrificial rites of removing them are meaningless.
Plus the disjunctive proposition:
Ghosts and gods either have thoughts that can hurt people (but they can't be found or
perceived, so people can't know whether the rites of removing ghosts is useful), or they don't
have thoughts that hurt people. And a form of reasoning similar to the “simple constructive
dilemma” is formed. The reasoning process can be formally expressed as:

p→q
r→q
pr
q
The reductio ad absurdum described in the above reasoning and its case content are also indirect
argumentation in terms of argumentation methods. Wang Chong’s argumentation method in
Lunheng is mostly direct argumentation, but indirect argumentation is also used occasionally,
and sometimes the two argumentation methods are even used in combination.
3. The research expansion of Wang Chong’s thoughts on argumentation:
3.1 From the perspective of Pragma-Dialectics
Since argumentation scholars in contemporary China still make a distinction between argument
and argumentation when discussing argumentative research, especially in the translation and
interpretation of the foreign literature concerned, and argument is generally understood as a
narrow sense of argumentation, that is, the traditional, abstract argument with a “premise -

conclusion” structure. Therefore, it is not difficult to see from the above chapter that the previous
researches about Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation are mostly defined and understood
from the perspective of narrow argument. However, the revival and development of
contemporary argumentation research is exactly due to the paradigm shift from the traditional
“premise - conclusion” structure and abstract propositional sequential argumentation to the
dynamic and active argumentation interpretation in the practical context. It is the theoretical
starting point of contemporary argumentative research to understand the concept of
argumentation by returning to argumentation practice and even daily discourse. In other words,
the development process of argumentation theory is also a process that “argument” breaks
through the narrow logical meaning and returns to the extensive argumentation practice so as to
reconnect with or even be equivalent to the meaning of “argumentation”. In fact, when I
reconsidered the content of Wang Chong's thoughts from the perspective of contemporary
theoretical research on argumentation, based on the core contents of Wang Chong's
argumentation thoughts mentioned above, which are “emphasis on facts” and “emphasis on
evidence”, it is not difficult to find that it is feasible to take these thoughts as a bridge to make
narrow argumentation lead to broader argumentation, and as a driving force for the development
of his argumentation thoughts and even his whole theoretical system of argumentation.
Taking the definition of argumentation in section 2.1 as an example, the understanding
and definition of those parts are very similar to the relevant understanding and definition of the
proof rules in traditional logic (the argument is reasonable; the argument must be able to deduce
the thesis correctly, etc.). However, from the perspective of contemporary argumentation
research, we can easily see the features of “interactivity (for example, from the second point
there is a consideration of the other party's feedback or even a kind of refutation.)”, “sociality (it
involves cases such as lawsuits, disputes, etc.)” and “purpose (argumentation is used to
distinguish right from wrong(fallacy))” contained in Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation
from those three dimensions concerning the definition, and those features also belong to the
necessary features of the argumentation definition in the contemporary argumentation research.
Similarly, taking the requirements about the argumentation in section 2.2 as an example,
Wang Chong discussed the contents of “Yin Xiaoyan” and “Li Zhengyan” in response to the
Confucian advocate of “lavish burial” and the Mohist idea about “the belief that when people
die, they become ghosts and sentient, and can turn into the image of living people to do harm to
other living people”, he argued for his standpoint that he believes that “the dead have no
consciousness” and “lavish burial has no benefits”: Wang Chong wrote,
The Mohist claim is to advocate ghosts. They believe that when people die, they become
ghosts and still have consciousness, and they can become the image of living people to do
harm to people. Therefore, they cite examples such as “Du Bo becoming a ghost” 6as an
evidence to prove that there are ghosts in the world. (Bozang)
But the examples they cite are actually only heard from people's rumors.
The confucianists did not believe that (referring to the Mohist viewpoint). They believed
that the dead had no consciousness and could not become ghosts, yet they prepared all
It is rumored that King Xuan in the Zhou Dynasty killed his senior official Du Bo, who was not guilty of any
crime. Then in the third year King Xuan went hunting in the wild, Du Bo appeared and shot King Xuan with a red
bow and arrow.
6

kinds of things when they helped others with funeral services and sacrifices.... (Ibid.)
The backing for this viewpoint is that: “no one in history has been resurrected because of
sacrifice”, “people have never ‘seen’ a ghost in the true sense (of the word).” These two views,
together with the previous discussion on “facts”, became the reasons for Wang Chong's
argumentation.
In the process of this argumentation, Wang Chong also took the possibility of a rebuttal
into account, such as:
If the dead are conscious, then it would be wrong to abandon the dead and forget their
ancestors (this refers to the reason that the Confucian advocated the lavish burial is
because people are afraid to forget the kindness of the predecessors and commit the crime
of unfilial behavior) is wrong. (Ibid.)
Regarding this point of view, Wang Chong said:
...There is no final conclusion as to the truth about life and death. In fact, the situation of
the dead is unknown, and it exists in a different world from the living. The real situation
of the dead is elusive and difficult to be understaood deeply. The truth between the
consciousness and the unconsciousness of the dead cannot be ascertained, then it is
impossible to ascertain whether people will become ghosts after death. Although
knowledgeable people are erudite and informed, they also cannot understand such things
clearly. (Ibid.)
It can be seen that he has also considered the limited scope of the conclusions or at least two
limited contents, that is, “so far (no one has actually ‘seen’ a ghost)” and “in the case that people
still do not know the real situation of the dead.”
The in-depth analysis and observation of the above argumentation will make us easily
associate with some contents of Toulmin’s model of argumentation. In the chapter discussing the
requirements of “Yin Xiaoyan, Li Zhengyan” and citing the above examples, Wang Chong also
explained that:
If you don't concentrate and think deeply when you’re arguing, but judge what is right or
wrong only on the basis of superficial phenomena, or on the basis of what you see and
hear from the outside rather than what you analyze and judge from the inside, then you
will argue based on false phenomena, and if you believe in the false phenomena, you will
take the facts as wrong. So the judgment of right and wrong can not only rely on the eyes
and ears but must also be through the inner thinking. The Mohist point of view was not
arrived at by thinking hard, but only by the superficial phenomena of things, and they
only believed what they heard, so that even though the Xiaoyan(validity of their
argument) was very remarkable, it was still deviated from the truth. (Ibid.)
Then we can make a deeper understanding and analysis of the content of Wang Chong's “Yin
Xiaoyan”, “Li Zhengyan” by combining it with Toulmin’s model of argumentation, and it can be
said that “Xiaoyan” corresponds to the “Datum / Data” in Toulmin’s model, and “Zhengyan”
corresponds to the “Backing / B.” The combination enables us to have a deeper understanding of

the true meanings about “Xiaoyan” and “Zhengyan,” and at the same time, it enables us to better
grasp the relationship structure between them.
While understanding and expanding Wang Chong's content about “Xiaoyan” and “Zhengyan”
through Toulmin’s model of argumentation, this way also brings new problems to be studied for
the content of Wang’s discourse. That is to say, Wang Chong repeatedly emphasized in the
previous discussion that, “the judgment of right and wrong can not only rely on the eyes and ears
and must be through the inner thinking ...The Mohist point of view was not arrived at by thinking
hard, but only by the superficial phenomena of things...so that... it was still deviated from the
truth...” and so on. So, what exactly needs to be thought through inner thinking here? And how to
promote the progress of the argument through inner thinking? These are the new problems that
need to be studied and dealt with. The perspectives and understandings of previous scholars who
regarded them as “the thinking activities of reasoning” are obviously quite narrow at present.
Although the concept of Backing in Toulmin's model of argumentation seems to enable people to
have a better understanding of the question of “what”, but it still can't well handle and answer the
above questions about “how to ...” well, especially when considering the actual argumentation in
daily life. Then here will introduce other related concepts in the argumentation theory to
understand and deal with the problem, that is, the concepts of “standpoint at issue” and
“unexpressed elements” in the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation proposed by van
Eemeren et al.formulated that:
If in argumentative discourse it is not clear exactly which standpoint is at issue, there is
no way of telling whether the argumentation that is advanced can lead to a resolution of
the difference of opinion that is discussed. In such a case, it is not only impossible to
determine whether the argumentation does indeed provide enough support for the
standpoint but even whether it is relevant at all. Identifying the standpoints discussed is
therefore the first task in analyzing argumentative discourse, and identifying means for
tracing standpoints constitutes a central problem area in argumentation theory. The
problems concerned can be dealt with only if it is first clear what exactly is meant by a
standpoint. (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 13)
The expression in this passage is very similar to Wang Chong's previous description of “inner
thinking.” The difference is that Wang Chong does not clearly state “what” cannot be judged
without “inner thinking”. The issue is very clear in this paragraph, that is, “the difference of
opinion that is discussed”, or “standpoint at issue / clear standpoint at issue.” So it seems that
taking such concepts and understanding into Wang Chong’s original discourse can not only
respond his later claims about others’ rebuttals, but also broaden the content and scope of his
argumentation. It can also provide the purpose for the actual argumentation in daily life, and
further provide targeted help for the consideration of argumentation methods.
The consideration of argumentation methods is actually the reflection on the question of
“how to...” mentioned above, which can be understood and solved through the relevant concept
of “unexpressed elements.” Van Eemeren et al. note:
It might be difficult to tell how argumentative discourse should resolve a difference of
opinion if certain elements that have remained implicit in the discourse are not taken into
account. This applies to standpoints and starting points that are left implicit but especially
to “unexpressed premises” in the argumentation that is advanced. When these implicit

elements are overlooked, a proper evaluation of the argumentation may be impossible.”
(Ibid., p. 17)
In terms of argumentation expression, the omitted unexpressed elements are often the premises
expressing axioms, common sense, assumptions and so on. Only by identifying the implicit
elements in the argument can the argumentation analysts make proper analysis and evaluation.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the key to understanding and solving the “how to...” problem
is to identify and grasp all kinds of implicit elements in the argument. Therefore, the unexpressed
elements that need to be considered are connected with the content of “Zhengyan” that Wang
Chong chose to further consider instead of being satisfied with “Xiaoyan,” and the reasons and
significance of his thoughts about the content are also answered.
In addition, some of the following contents of “Lun Guishi and Shi Shangran” can also be
understood by Van Eemeren's concept of “strategic maneuvering.” For example, Wang Chong
comments:
If you modify your appearance too much to be similar to others, you will lose your
original appearance; if you modify your words too much in order to cater to others, you
will lose the content of your thoughts. (Ziji)
The point of view here is very similar to the concept about “keeping a balance between aiming
for effectiveness and maintaining reasonableness” (Ibid.), that is, one cannot just pursue
effectiveness or pay too much attention to rhetoric. It also includes the contents of the previous
definition, such as:
There must be reasonable and unreasonable in a lawsuit, and there must be right and
wrong in an argumentation. The part that is wrong and unreasonable loses, and the part
that is right and reasonable wins. (Wushi)
Although the above content seems to be discussing rational content here, Wang Chong actually
said in the following text:
It is possible for some people to win(the argument) by being good at eloquence, good at
debate, and clear and fluent in speech; others may fail due to stuttering, incoherent
language and inability to express words. (Ibid.)
The viewpoint mentioned here seem to take into account rhetorical means of persuasion and
effectiveness dimension for the actual argumentation in daily life. Finally, Wang added,
Arguing and litigate with your tongue is like fighting with sword or halberd. With a sharp
sword or a long-handled halberd, coupled with strong hands and quick feet, you will
surely win; with a blunt sword or a short halberd, coupled with weak hands and slow feet,
you will surely fail. (Ibid.)
In China, the scene of heated argument is often compared to “Chun Qiang She Jian7.” Therefore,
the tongue is compared to the weapons, and the aforementioned eloquence, good at debate, etc.
A Chinese idiom about using the lips as a gun and the tongue as a sword. It describes a heated argument with sharp
words.
7

are like sharp weapons. However, the key to “win” depends not only on the sharpness of the
weapons, but also on the “fundamental factor” that can be matched, that is, the reasonable
requirements for the body. In other words, if the body is not in good shape and unable to use the
corresponding weapons, then no matter how lethal the weapon is, it is still not certain to win.
Therefore, Wang Chong's discussion here can be understood as not only his attitude to balance
the effectiveness and the reasonableness simultaneously, but also such reflections as follows: In
the process of argumentation, we not only need to deal with the balance between reasonableness
and effectiveness in our argumentative discourse, but also need to explore and analyze the
corresponding problems of the argumentative opponents to help us be better prepared and use the
corresponding argumentative strategies to make the opponents accept our views.
3.2. Understanding and reflection on the “Truth Requirement”
It is not difficult to see from the above examples that Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation
and the contents of them can be “relevant and interactive” with some research contents in the
modern theoretical system of argumentation. At the same time, they also prove that it is very
feasible to develop a new understanding and expansion Wang Chong's thoughts on
argumentation and their contents from the perspective of modern argumentation theory. On the
other hand, can Wang Chong's thoughts on argumentation and the contents have a new
understanding and helpful significance to some problems in the current argumentation research
field? The authors believe that the answer to this question is yes.
Taking the content of “truth requirement” in Ralph Johnson's theory of argument as an
example, for many early scholars of informal logic, the acceptability requirement often served as
a replacement for truth requirement. The reason for this is, on the one hand, the cognition of the
correlation between the truth requirement and formal logic, on the other hand, due to the
“intimate relationship” between the acceptability requirement and the actual persuasion, and the
possible conflict between the truth requirement and acceptability requirement. Since the 1990s,
Johnson began to reflect on this alternative problem, and then concluded that for a good
argument, “the acceptability requirement is too weak in many cases,” and ultimately requires the
truth requirement to be reapplied in argument evaluation. Of course, in the process of this
transformation, many scholars began to question the concept and its existence of the truth
requirement because of the differences between the requirement of truth and acceptability:
As one moves away from science and towards a different sphere of reasoning – the
practical sphere of human decision-making, the areas of morals, ethics, politics and
everyday human affairs – that doctrine(the requirement about truth) does begin to seem
questionable...it(argumentation in these areas) becomes clear that the premises need not
be true in order for the argument to be a good one. (Johnson 1996, p. 89)
And previously, Johnson (1991) frankly states,
I am not inclined to reject both acceptability and acceptance as the proper criteria to
impose on premises in respect of their connection to the dialectical context (wider world).
On the other hand... I am not yet willing to go back to “truth” as a requirement, which
leads to the following intriguing question: Is there an “X” such that it is a “weaker”
standard than truth but “stronger” than acceptance? (Ibid., p. 264)

Then the main issue to be considered here should be the definition of the degree of the true
standard, that is, “what degree of the truth can be considered acceptable if the premise meets?”
Of course, this is considered from the objective perspective of argumentation. If it is from the
perspective of doubter, or it can also be said that people's main contradiction is actually the
necessity of judging the truth requirement based on their own understanding and definition of the
concept of the truth, which is actually of too much emphasis on the subjectivity and application
of argumentation.
In fact, it is necessary to bring the concepts of acceptability requirement and the truth
requirement into Wang Chong's concepts of “Xiaoyan” and “Zhengyan” respectively for
understanding and analysis. Because, even though Wang Chong has repeatedly emphasized that,
“Even if there are fundamental reasons for false words, people will still not be convinced”
(Bozang).
But from the previous discussion:
The Mohist point of view was not arrived at by thinking hard, but only by the superficial
phenomena of things, they only believed what they heard, so that even though the
Xiaoyan(validity of their argument) was very remarkable, it was still deviated from the
truth. (Ibid.)
It is not difficult to see from the above passage that in reality there are still people who choose to
believe in the discourse of “remarkable Xiaoyan,” and “remarkable Xiaoyan” can also be
interpreted as a discourse that emphasizes acceptability or acceptance. However, the reason why
Wang Chong criticized the Mohist opinion was that the Mohist viewpoint only had the
“remarkable Xiaoyan,” but lacked the “Zhengyan” to sufficiently prove the authenticity of the
content. Therefore, Wang Chong said that the viewpoint was “deviated from the truth”, and that
“this is also the reason why the Mohist viewpoint could not be spread.”
In Manifest Rationality, written by Johnson, there is an expression similar to Wang
Chong’s thought here: “I want to hold open the possibility that even if his arguments were
effective and persuasive, they are not good arguments” (Johnson 2000, p. 189). Correspondingly,
if the concept of “Zhengyan” is matched with the truth requirement, the relationship between the
criteria of truth and acceptability can be better understood. In fact, after about two thousand
years, Wang Chong's argument for proving “no ghosts” is still practical nowadays. Therefore, the
contents and viewpoints discussed by Wang Chong not only illustrate the necessity of
“Zhengyan” for a good argument, but also reflect and explain the significance of the existence of
the truth requirement.
In our opinion, the relationship between the criteria of truth and acceptability should not
be the relationship of degree as proposed earlier, nor should they exist as something that
separates the two ends of the degree. Taking the research content of Wang Chong’s “Yin Xiaoyan
and Li Zhengyan” as an example, as the understanding of the two concepts, we can see that they
are not completely equivalent, whether from the perspective of traditional logic or from the
perspective of modern argumentation study, and that “Zhengyan” is obviously a concept that acts
on “Xiaoyan.”
Therefore, in view of the above understanding and analysis, we believe that the truth
requirement can actually be used as the restrictive criteria or scope of the acceptability
requirement, and it is the tool imposed on the acceptability requirement to “pull back” or restrict
the argumentation content in the argumentation activities of partial-subjectivity as much as

possible into the objective and real scope. The theoretical content presented here is similar to the
concept about “keeping a balance between aiming for effectiveness and maintaining
reasonableness” proposed by Van Emmeren et al. The reason is that this coincidence-like
common contents belong to the “argumentative predicament” that is generally present in the
argumentative behavior, at the same time, these contents are also the considerations of balance
between rationality and sensibility that people are bound to face in practical argumentation.
In addition, as we all know that Johnson’s motivation for reintroducing the truth
requirement is closely related to his concern that the acceptability requirement reduce to the
audience-oriented acceptance requirement. The introduction of truth requirement is actually
Johnson's attempt to draw a clear line between the logic and rhetoric brought by the RSAtriangle. In fact, we can also understand the motivation, significance and balance of boundary
issues of Johnson’s insistence on preserving truth requirement by comparing Wang Chong's
motivation to write the Lunheng. As for the writing motivation and purpose of writing the
Lunheng, Wang Chong made a clear exposition in the chapter of Duizuo:
The writing of Lunheng stems from the fact that the records of many books have been
inaccurate, and the false words are better than the real words. Therefore,if the words of
Xuwang (see above) are not be abolished, the specious articles will not be suppressed; if
there are too many specious articles, the essays that seek truth from facts will not be
accepted. So Lunheng is used to weigh right and wrong of speech, and establish the
criterion for judging the authenticity...The false is more conspicuous than the real, the
truth is confused by the false, people do not understand, the right and wrong are
indistinguishable, (just like) the purple and vermilion are mixed together, and the tiles
and gems are mixed together. How can my heart bear it...hope to awaken those deluded
minds to know the difference between false and true. If the distinction between the real
and the false is established, the false and specious articles will be destroyed; if the false
and specious articles are destroyed, the enlightenment of purity and sincerity will grow
day by day...Now Lunheng is aimed at the secular books, examines and distinguishes
their authenticity...the purpose in chapters of “Jiuxu and Sanzeng” is to make ordinary
people strive to seek truth from facts.
To sum up, Wang Chong believed that the criterion for testing all knowledge of the false and true
should not be the words said or written by the so-called sages, but the “Xiaoyan” of the objective
facts, that is, the authenticity evidence of the objective things or phenomena themselves serve as
the criterion of judgment. It can also be seen from Lunheng that Wang Chong always took the
objective truth as his criterion for evaluating arguments in his argumentation. Although the
“objective truth” here contains the limitations of Wang Chong's cognitive scope and historical
background, his motivation for pursuing objective truth also comes from the historical
background in which false and real are reversed each other at that time. In this context, Wang
Chong worried that the society has been maintaining the state of “the false is more conspicuous
than the real, the truth is confused by the false, people do not understand, the right and wrong are
indistinguishable...” Therefore, he wanted to destroy “Xuwang”and could not help writing the
book Lunheng. And He wanted to use it to “weigh right and wrong of speech, and establish the
criterion for judging the authenticity”, “explain the doubts...make the latter see the difference
between right and wrong”, and ultimately make (people in) the whole society can “seek truth
from facts.” It has to be said that Wang Chong's attitude to emphasizing the objective truth and

worrying about people being confused by the excessive specious articles is in some ways very
similar to Johnson's insistence on retaining the truth requirement associated with the way of logic
and his worry about “dropping the truth requirement and introducing the acceptability
requirement, informal logicians have so I believe been persuaded by rhetorical values and
concerns.”
From the present point of view, although the above-mentioned contents described by
Wang Chong cannot directly solve or deal with Johnson’s concerns about the relevance between
RSA-triangle criteria and the area of logic, after all, Wang Chong at that time did not have the
cognition of the concept of the “logic” in the west. But when we are looking for the
commonalities between Wang Chong’s and Johnson’s thoughts, it is possible to make people
understand the worries of Wang Chong and Johnson and the purpose and significance of their
work for this by re-examining the reasons for Johnson’s reservation and defense of “truth
requirement” in combination with Wang Chong’s era background and known historical lessons.
Furthermore, it can help us to better understand the purpose and significance of Johnson’s later
introduction of the fundamental idea of “manifest rationality” in his theory of argument. Since
the discussion of this paper focuses on the introduction or “referral” of the classical and possible
contents of Wang Chong’s thoughts on argumentation, the further research contents on the
relationship between Wang’s thoughts and Johnson’s thoughts about “manifest rationality” will
not intend to be described in this paper.
4. Conclusion
The available literature shows that most scholars' interpretation of Wang Chong's argumentation
thoughts is still the concept of narrow argumentation, that is, it is still only based on the concept
of argument composed of topics, evidences, and methods of argument in the traditional logical
perspective, and it is used to reconstruct, analyze and evaluate a series of argumentation contents
in Wang Chong's Lunheng. However, with the rise of contemporary informal logic and
argumentation theories, the understanding of argumentation has gradually changed from a
productive and structural way to a procedural and pragmatic way. Therefore, on the basis of a
brief overview of some previous research contents about Wang Chong's thoughts on
argumentation, this paper attempts to further understand, analyze and expand the contents of
Wang Chong’s argumentation thoughts through the intersection of different dimensions of
argumentation theories researches and his thoughts on argumentation, and attempts to further
understand and reflect on the problems and development connotation in contemporary researches
of argumentation theories through Wang Chong's concepts and thoughts on argumentation.
Since this seems to be the “first show” of Wang Chong's argumentation thoughts and
their basic contents in the international argumentation conference, it is undeniable that the focus
of this paper is still only a tentative introduction (from ancient Chinese to modern Chinese and
then to English...) or exploratory development research of some concepts in Wang Chong's
thoughts on argumentation. In addition, due to the limited ability, the contents of this paper may
be a little insufficient to fully show more researches about Wang Chong's thoughts on
argumentation, including: The analysis and comparison between Wang Chong's argumentation
criteria and the argumentation criteria in other argumentation theories, the specific analysis and
understanding of the concept of “truth” in Lunheng (a supplement to the content described in the
end of section 3.2), and the research contents on fallacies, etc. This is a very regrettable thing and
we can only hope that the above contents will be further (more) presented in the subsequent
researches and papers.

Finally, we would like to point out that in today's society, with the development of
science and technology, the functions of various communication tools are constantly evolving,
and people can obtain a large amount of information through different channels every day,
among which there is no lack of various forms of fallacy. Taking the current epidemic of
COVID-19 as an example, every day people can receive a lot of false information or statements
made for some improper benefits or simply to cause panic, so “How should we balance our
sensibility and rationality in the face of the crisis of the epidemic and the madness of the
crowd?” At this time, the ability to extract and discriminate information and the thinking pattern
of critical thinking are the tools we need to face various discourse problems. As for the way to
use these tools, we can also find the answer from the research of Wang Chong's thoughts on
argumentation. At the same time, it also constitutes the practical significance of studying Wang
Chong’s thoughts on argumentation.
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